


























The Impact of Corruption and Local Content Policy in 




Many governments of both resource-rich and resource-poor countries have recently started to 
use local content policies as a tool in their industrial policies. However, careless 
implementation of local content policies can lead to corrupt practices and threaten firm 
performance. Using the World Bank Enterprise Survey of 933 Kazakhstani firms in 2009 and 
2013, we study the effect of corruption on employment and sales growth and the role that 
explicit local content policy plays in this relationship. Our findings demonstrate that corruption 
has “a greasing the wheels effects”, facilitating employment growth and sales growth in 
Kazakhstani firms. In case of securing a government contract, corruption will have a larger 
effect on sales growth than on job growth. This study provides insights and implications for 
contract law and industrial policy in Kazakhstan.  
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1. Introduction  
Many governments of both resource-rich and resource-poor countries have recently started 
to use local content policies (LCPs) as a tool in their industrial policies. There is no universally 
agreed definition of local content (LC), and every country has its own definitions, emphases 
and variations depending on the period of policy implementation and the stage of economic 
development (Kalyuzhnova et.al. 2016). Kolstad and Kinyondo (2017) define LC as “the 
incidence of domestic inputs in the various parts of a value chain” (Kolstad and Kinyondo 
2017:411). Therefore, overall, LCPs aim to increase in-country value (Ovadia 2012) by 
enabling domestic producers to expand their activities, compete with imports and add more 
value to their products (Kalyuzhnova et al. 2016). LCPs are government-led policies that often 
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promote, support and provide privileges to local companies (Ovadia 2014). Overall, LCPs are 
perceived as a way of promoting economic and social development.  
However, careless implementation of LCPs can lead to corrupt practices. Officials may 
overstep their authority and use their influence to implement the established Local Content 
Requirements (LCRs) to benefit their interests (or those of their allies/their family members, 
etc.), inciting other players (e.g. international companies) to bribe the authorities. To date, the 
literature on links between LCPs and corruption vulnerabilities is limited (Martini 2014; Nwapi 
2015). However, even from these limited sources it is evident that in order to prevent and curb 
corruption in LCR it is important to establish a set of measures which would enhance 
transparency and accountability in conducting such LCPs (e.g. including anti-corruption 
clauses into agreements/licenses).    
Unfortunately, LCPs, transparency and governance are not well-linked in the literature.  
Such a disconnect is unfortunate, considering the crucial influence of these factors on the 
successful implementation of LCPs. In order to achieve greater firm performance through the 
introduction of LCPs, it is important to take into account the microfoundations of corruption. 
(Tonoyan, et.al. 2010; Sarsfield, 2012).   
We define corruption as the use of public office for personal gain (Rose-Ackerman and 
Palifka 2016) and more broadly as suggested by Lambsdorff (2002) and Aidt (2016: 145): “as 
a special means by which private agents may seek to pursue their interest in competition for 
preferential treatment by government officials or politicians and where the ‘‘means’’ are valued 
by the recipient” (Aidt 2016:145).  Examples of ‘‘special means’’ may include contracts and 
licenses, procedures, permissions and minimum LCRs.  
Some literature shows a positive impact of corruption on firm performance, especially with 
firms that do not face significant competition (Athanasouli et al. 2012; Sahakyan and Stiegert 
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2012). Other literature shows a negative impact (Treisman 2000; McArthur and Teal 2002; 
Glaeser and Saks 2006; Hallward‐Driemeier et al. 2006; Dutta and Sobel 2016). Most of these 
studies treat corruption as a business environment using country-level indicators of corruption 
instead of firm-level indicators.  
In this paper we argue that the impact of corruption on firm performance is determined by 
both explicit LCPs and an economic environment with a mix of formal and informal institutions 
(Williamson 1998). While prior work on the causes of corruption (Tonoyan, et.al. 2010) and 
LCP (Nwapi, 2015) has been done on the macro level, our study examines micro foundations 
of corruption and firm performance. This approach helps to understand how firms behave at 
the micro level and how exactly corruption and LCP are associated with firm performance.  
To explore this issue, we employ firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey 
on 933 Kazakhstani firms over the period 2009 to 2013, namely, firm characteristics that 
include engagement with local authorities and adjustment to regulation and government 
programmes, such as LCPs. However, LCPs and bureaucracy factors have rarely been 
incorporated into empirical studies, particularly in studies of emerging economies 
(Kalyuzhnova et al. 2016).  
The choice of Kazakhstan was determined for a number of reasons: the country has adopted 
aggressive and restrictive LCPs; it experienced growth in firm formation during the transition 
period between 1999 and 2007 (An et al. 2017); high levels of inequality in market access 
encourage substantial involvement of firm representatives with authorities to smooth the entry 
and enhance firm performance (Aidis, et.al. 2012); and well-documented data on the country 
is available from the World Bank Survey and macro-economic regulation. That said, the 
phenomena identified here are also likely to be found in other countries through the use of firm-
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level data and measures in order to capture the impact of corruption on firm performance under 
various regulation modes (i.e. LCPs).  
This study provides a critical test which is based on a literature (Djankov et al. 2002 and 
Kalyuzhnova et al. 2009) that analyses the impact of corruption and LCPs on firm performance. 
The study also offers new perspectives for the development of policies supporting LC 
development. In particular, this paper emphasises the importance of the link between 
corruption and LCPs in various measurements of firm performance, namely: employment 
growth and sales growth. 
By introducing LCPs into the public economic literature, we achieve three important 
contributions. 
Our first contribution is built on institutional literature (Djankov et al. 2002). From the 
perspective of LCPs (Flaig and Stone 2017), we provide an empirical test of the effect of 
corruption on various measurements of firm performance, and of the role that LCPs play in this 
relationship. 
Our second contribution, through the examination of this relationship, is to establish that 
LCPs mitigate the relationship between corruption and sales growth. Finally, we discuss 
transparency and governance in the context of LCPs (Kalyuzhnova et al. 2009, 2016; Ovadia 
2014).  
Our key findings confirm that corruption has both “greasing and sanding the wheels of 
business effects”, facilitating employment growth whilst hampering productivity in 
Kazakhstani firms.  We respond to a call in institutional and economic systems literature for a 
more nuanced analysis of how firm performance is influenced by corruption and LCPs (van 
Stel et al. 2007; Djankov 2009, Kalyuzhnova et.al. 2009). We find that corrupt behavior is 
facilitated by LCPs in Kazakhstan and we provide answers to the question of whether building 
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relationships with authorities changes firm performance. Although our findings are related to 
Kazakhstan, our conclusions are likely to be applicable to other resource-rich emerging 
countries pursuing LCPs.  
The implications for policy are as follows. We argue that improvements in regulation are 
required in order to achieve greater transparency and governance in LCPs, as these are crucial 
factors for the successful implementation of such policies. A dedicated state agency should 
have as special remit, with a public mandate, the monitoring, evaluation and enforcement of 
compliance. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section (Section 2), we discuss the evolution 
of LCPs in Kazakhstan and its specifics.  Section 3 provides the theoretical framework. Section 
4 sets up an empirical model, and describes the dataset. Section 5 reports our main results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Local content policies in Kazakhstan 
From the beginning of independence, the Kazakhstani government has aimed to create jobs 
and to create an environment promoting Kazakhstani (local, by origin) businesses in specific 
sectors. However, in the early 1990s, the foreign firms had a significant dominance over the 
industrial and service sectors of the hydrocarbon industry of Kazakhstan, where the mode of 
operation was based on an "expatriate" basis (both in terms of human resources and 
manufacturing facilities, which were exported from abroad).  (Kalyuzhnova 2008) 
This situation continued for most of the decade, leading the Kazakhstani government to 
seek ways of boosting LC through legislation, in order to develop the industrial capacities of 
the local economy. Although Kazakhstan’s LCPs first appeared with the Petroleum Law of 
1995, the first concrete step was made in the 2000s: “the Registry of Domestic Producers and 
Foreign Investors was developed to provide local producers the opportunity to understand the 
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potential demand and to act accordingly in their investment decisions and upgrades” 
(Kalyuzhnova et.al. 2016:108). The basis of such policy was government pressure on 
international energy companies working in Kazakhstan to build up local capabilities via 
subcontractors and services. The 1996 Law on Subsurface and Subsurface Use required 
companies to propose, from the initial stage, their own LC commitments, namely quantitative 
indicators (%) of local workers to be employed, procuring products and services of Kazakh (or 
Kazakhstani) origin, and commitment to social projects (e.g. improving infrastructure or 
contributing to the economic and social development of their region of operation). However, 
this approach was not successful, since subsoil users subverted or bypassed LCRs.  
From 2001, LCRs were promoted by the government through a number of laws, decrees 
and labour quotas. In addition, the government was obliging companies to invest in regional 
social projects. On 1 December 2004, the terms “Kazakh manufacturer”, “Kazakh origin” 
(goods, works and services (GWS) of Kazakh origin), “Kazakh content” were introduced into 
the subsoil legislation, as part of a governmental review of the LCPs framework. More specific 
LCPs were laid out in the 2005 Law Concerning Production Sharing Agreements when 
Conducting Offshore Petroleum Operations. This law required that KMG (KazMunayGaz, the 
national oil company) hold at least a 50% share of new Production Sharing Agreements, and 
defined specific requirements to ensure purchase of local goods and services.  
However, until the end of 2009, the LCP in Kazakhstan was more a statement of intent than 
robust policy. For instance, even though the rules for purchasing GWS by subsoil users were 
first approved by the Kazakhstani Government Decree in 2002, “the majority of subsoil users 
did not actually apply these rules and kept purchasing GWS at their discretion” (Kalyuzhnova 
et.al 2016:109). December 29, 2009, saw the adoption of the Law on Amendments to Some 
Legislative Acts on Kazakh Content; in 2010, further evolution of LC took place with 
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significant regulatory change represented by the introduction of the new Law on Subsurface 
and Subsurface Use (2010).  
LCPs (although still focusing on local labour and procurement) were thus “shifted toward 
the overarching objective of economic diversification and the reduction of economic 
dependency on the oil sector” (Tordo and Anouti 2013:114). The government had introduced 
clear targets, procurement rules, and strict measurement procedures. The spillover of such 
policies was felt on all sectors of the economy. 
Prequalification of potential suppliers is an independent audit of potential suppliers, which 
allows to assess the supplier’s ability to perform work, provide services and deliver goods, and 
also protect from the participation of other firms. Currently 600 Kazakhstani companies have 
been prequalified. As a part of the pilot project, 64 items of goods, works and services have 
been identified, for which since April 3 of this year, procurements have been made only among 
prequalified suppliers. The listed potential suppliers are exempt from payment of the tender 
application fees, confirmation of staff qualifications and work experience, as well as 
notarization of documents within 2-3 years. In addition, an independent evaluation gives 
companies point-wise recommendations for improving their operations. 
The existing LCPs have only partially achieved their purposes. Localization of workforce 
policy has indeed pushed the companies to use more local labour force and to invest in their 
upscaling, but with regards to procurement and the competitiveness of Kazakhstani companies 
the situation is more complex. Domestic sourcing of GWS proved to be extremely difficult. 
For example, under the procurement rules, subsoil users are obliged to announce forthcoming 
purchases, tender documentation, etc., and post their results on an online registry of GWS. 
Since Kazakhstan’s domestic capacity remains low, international technical expertise and 
capital is required.   
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In 2015 Kazakhstan jointed WTO. Under WTO regulations, in particular GATT and 
TRIMS, LCR in the form of mandatory sourcing of inputs is explicitly prohibited. However, a 
series of exemptions exists relating to government procurement, the encouragement of 
technology transfer and for least developed countries (Ramdoo 2015). The WTO agreement, 
ratified by Kazakhstan, establishes a transition period for full implementation of WTO 
requirements until 1 January 2021. Following the transition period all measures of support and 
LCRs in the subsoil contracts are to be abolished.  Subsidies connected with export and import 
substitution will be prohibited upon the agreement coming into legal force and all LCRs on 
procurement of goods and services (for commercial use) are to be abolished.  Accession to the 
WTO potentially signals the beginning of a new approach to industrial policy in Kazakhstan, 
e.g. the effect of this policy on LCRs by companies affiliated with Joint Stock Company (JSC) 
Samruk-Kazyna should change the company’s perceptions of competitiveness (without 
protectionist measures), as well as testing the effectiveness of the functioning of these 
enterprises. Since Subsoil Law (1996), LC has been an evolving and increasingly important 
element of Kazakhstan’s approach to natural resource management. From 2021 such policies 
are to be abandoned. WTO membership thus redefines the parameters for industrial policy in 
Kazakhstan.   
The precise impact of WTO membership on industrial policy remains, however, to be seen. 
LCR are only weakly enforced by the WTO (Ramdoo 2015) and the experience of other 
resource rich economies, such as Norway, suggests that alternative policies can be 
implemented to achieve similar goals. 
At the present time, however, these outcomes remain speculative. Formally Kazakhstan’s 
oil and gas sector has a finite period to impose protectionist measures to develop domestic 
(infant) industries, facilitate sectoral catching-up and incentivize the competitiveness of the 
sector. Will the 2010 Subsoil and Subsoil users Law in Kazakhstan, which establishes the 
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principle of blanket minimum LCR for new concessions, be successful in its aim to diversify 
the industrial sector and encourage the development of small and medium enterprises to 
international standards, thus ultimately improving the country’s competitiveness by 2021? 
Over the recent past, Kazakhstan’s competitiveness index has improved; the country was 
ranked 42nd out of 140 countries in Schwab and Sala-i-Martín (2015).  However, measures of 
the business environment still suffer from concerns about corruption and rule of law providing 
security of property rights.  
To sustain its position and to improve further, the country needs to look at the particular 
pillars that determine the success or failure of the governmental economic policy. Until 2021 
this will include both protectionist measures (in the form of LCRs) and competition policy. 
Would the LCP, restricted under WTO rules, make a difference to overall Kazakhstani 
competitiveness? The experience of other resource rich countries demonstrates that in some 
cases LCPs can stimulate domestic product development and exports; other cases have 
established that the LCRs can become an impediment to competitiveness, for instance when a 
country’s innovation system fails to facilitate innovation-led growth adequately, or when 
implementation inhibits competition. Experience with LCPs also demonstrates that despite 
ambitions to terminate LCRs, in accordance with timelines embodied in WTO agreements or 
other international treaties, some resource-rich countries support/promote LCPs beyond the 
agreed dates. In such cases the form, term and strategy undergo changes, but the extraction-led 
domestic value-added production remains essentially the same. Kazakhstan would need a 
rigorous analysis of the current situation, acknowledging the constraints of the time frame with 
realistic expectations of what could be done with the momentum of the last LCPs.  
3. Theoretical framework 
3.1. Corruption and firm performance 
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Corruption and procedural bureaucracy are known to negatively affect firm 
performance and limit access to the markets (North 1990). Literature on corruption also claims 
that adjustment to regulation formally and informally improves inefficiencies (Spiller 1990) in 
countries with weak institutions. The variation of firm performance is conditional upon the 
relations between business and the government authorities (Hellman et al. 2003). Firms which 
face a high administrative burden may seek help from corrupt government officials in order to 
increase their economic activity (Dutta and Sobel 2016).  
Although an environment with many long bureaucratic procedures affects 
entrepreneurial opportunities and decreases returns, firms that manage to establish the efficient 
“means” of dealing with regulation by engaging in a variety of networking practices with 
authorities perform better (Aidis et al. 2012). In “grabbing hand” situations, the literature 
suggests that corrupt government officials create rents which they extract for themselves 
through the introduction of “artificial scarcity via licenses, permissions, cumbersome 
procedures, etc” (Aidt 2016: 151). 
Unwillingness to engage in networks and build relationships with authorities may act 
as a barrier to survival and growth.  World Bank Enterprise Survey illustrated that in 
Kazakhstan, the top two obstacles for the small firms are corruption and practices of informal 
sector; for medium firms – tax rate and corruption; for large firms - inadequately educated 
workforce and practices of informal sector. (World Bank 2013). Therefore, the firms will 
attempt to alleviate these obstacles by collaborating and negotiating business conditions with 
authorities in order to get access to internal information about the timing and changes in 
regulation. (Søreide 2002).  
The literature on rent-seeking suggests that corruption can pave the way to avoid an 
inefficient regulatory environment, in particular in emerging and developing economies 
(“helping hand” type of corruption) (Becker and Stigler 1974, Wieneke and Gries 2011; 
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McArthur and Teal 2002). There is an argument that in countries where corruption is expected 
in every transaction (Meon and Sekkat 2015), the expectation ameliorates the ‘arbitrariness’ of 
corruption and greases the wheels of business. In the rent-seeking literature the rents are often 
perceived as given (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016).  Corruption affects firm performance 
across different firm-sizes (Mendoza et.al. 2015), with larger firms potentially benefiting more 
from rent-seeking behaviour than smaller firms.  
Contemporary literature finds insufficient link between corruption and low productivity 
(Lambsdorff 2003), and demonstrates that some firms could be more productive than others. 
For example, exporters tend to be larger and more productive than non-exporters. Some 
evidence suggests that in regions where there is a scope for corruption in the process of 
obtaining export licenses or regulations related to exports, these exporter premia are smaller 
than in regions without such scope (Francis and Schweiger 2017). 
Some studies perceive corruption as a “greasing the wheels mean”, with corruption 
helping to overcome bureaucratic constraints and rigid regulations and requirements (Lein 
1986), in particular in a weak institutional environment (Acemoglu and Verdier 2000, Meon 
and Weill 2010). Djankov et al. (2002) introduced the tollbooth hypothesis, which suggested 
that higher procedural bureaucracy leads directly to increased corruption as government 
officials offer to “grease the wheels” in return for financial compensation. Supporters of the 
concept of efficient corruption argue that the ability to comply with the administrative and 
financial burden, which may result in corrupt officials, can “grease the wheels” of the 
regulatory system and facilitate firm performance. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
H1: Firm corruption increases firm performance. 
3.2. Local content policy, corruption and firm performance 
The government authorities responsible for LCPs implementation often use their own 
discretion, combined with a lack of transparency. This results in uneven implementation and 
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enforcement of LCRs (Kalyuzhnova 2008). LCPs are not approached uniformly in all 
countries. In some countries, there are clear stipulations (explicit LCPs) on the minimum level 
of LCR that firms must embrace (even in the strict quantitative terms). This is especially the 
case in countries with local content legislation and rigid prescriptions, e.g. Nigeria, Angola, 
etc. In other countries, there are not such clear stipulations (implicit LCPs) and the policies are 
less prescriptive and less formal.  In countries with explicit LCPs, in order to win contracts, the 
firms are required by the authorities to demonstrate in their bids a high level of LCRs 
compliance. In countries with implicit LCPs the share of LC in value added becomes a subject 
of negotiation/bargaining between the government and a firm, e.g. Russia, UK. (Kalyuzhnova 
et al. 2016). 
The LCPs are likely to create more opportunities for corruption (Belitski et al. 2016) as 
regulation may be formulated in a way that keeps the door open for further negotiations, 
particularly when the LCRs are subject to changes.  
We build on Bicchieri and Duffy (1997), Bicchieri and Rovelli (1994) in explaining the 
role of the LCPs in facilitating “greasing the wheels” of business through corruption (Lien 
1990; Kaufmann and Wei 2000; Meon and Sekkat 2015).  
It is expected that the LCPs should promote and facilitate higher participation of small and 
medium firms and ultimately enhance industrial development. In the protected environment, 
the domestic firms would be able to identify existing opportunities and build a successful niche 
business (Heum et al. 2003). 
It is important to understand the impact of the explicit LCPs implementation in facilitating 
firm performance and building a relationship between the government and the firm. In order to 
achieve this, it is necessary to look at the interplay between the explicit LCPs and corruption. 
Explicit LCPs are more likely to be successful in ensuring participation of firms in procurement 
when it is complemented with adequate monitoring and transparency process. However, in the 
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case of weak institutions, explicit LCRs serve as a tool for extracting rent.  In order to create 
jobs, facilitate sales and increase productivity, firms therefore choose to comply with LCRs 
and to corrupt the authorities.  The aim of corrupt activities is to secure a contract on 
procurement with a government. Thus, explicit LCPs serve as a tool facilitating corruption and 
increasing firm performance. Therefore we hypothesize: 
H2: Explicit LCPs positively moderate the relationship between firm corruption and firm 
performance. 
 
4. Empirical methodology  
4.1. The model 
          We investigate a relationship between firm performance, its exposure to explicit LCPs 
and corruption controlling for different firm level characteristics – including foreign 
ownership, manager experience, use of IT, firm age and size, engagement with the government. 
The model allows a closer look at how LCPs may initiate corrupt behavior of firms in 
Kazakhstan and the role LCPs play in firm size and performance. This study analyzes the 
relationship between firm performance and corruption, then introduces the LCPs as a channel 
through which corruption may affect firm performance.  
To test our hypotheses, we use fixed effects linear estimation to measure the regional, 
industry and time effects (Cumming et al. 2014). This enables us to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across regions, industries and time in one model. We follow Wallace and Hussain 
(1969) and Wooldridge (2010) by estimating the regression model given by equation (1) with 
two-way error component disturbances as in equation (2).  𝜆𝑟. denotes the unobservable 
regional effect (Wooldridge 2010), 𝜆𝑡 denotes the unobservable time effect, 𝜆𝑠 denotes the 
unobservable industry effect and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the remainder stochastic disturbance term. Note that 
14 
 
𝜆𝑖 is firm-invariant and accounts for any time-specific effect not included in the regression. For 
example, it could account for government program intervention year effects that disrupt firm 
productivity or facilitate LCPs. 𝜆𝑡 is time invariant and accounts for any region-specific effects, 
such as culture and informal institutional frameworks. In vector form, our panel data estimation 
is written as:   
𝑦𝑖 =  𝑓(𝛽𝑥𝑖,Ɵ𝑧𝑖,𝑎𝑖,  𝜇𝑖 )  i=1,..., N;    t=1,...,T      (1) 
𝑢𝑖=𝜆𝑟 + 𝜆𝑡 +𝜆𝑠+ ei  r=1,..., R;    s=1,..., S;                 (2) 
where 𝑦𝑖 is employment growth, sales growth in a given firm i. β and Ɵ are parameters to be 
estimated, 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of independent explanatory variables (firm corruption and LCPs) and 
𝑧𝑖 is a vector of exogenous firm and regional level control variables; 𝑎𝑖 presents the interaction 
of firms which secured government contracts with the firm corruption indicator by firm i. As 
mentioned above, the error term 𝑢𝑖 consists of unobserved regional, industry and time specific 
effects and other disturbance. 𝑒𝑖 is independent and identically distributed.  
4.2. Data 
We tested our hypotheses with the fourth and fifth round of the EBRD-World Bank 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) also known as the World 
Bank Enterprise Survey1. This survey is designed to study the impact of government policies 
on business activity (Fries et al. 2003) and involves face-to-face interviews with high-level 
firm managers or owners (Hellman et al. 2003). BEEPS firm-level data was matched with 
regional data (Azhgaliyeva et al. 2017). The surveys were administered using the Enterprise 
Surveys Global Methodology, which was the same for 2009 and 2013 in Kazakhstan. 
(http://www.enterprisesurveys.org, The World Bank). The primary sampling unit of the study 
is the establishment. An establishment is a physical location where business is carried out and 
                                                          
1 http://ebrd-beeps.com/ and http://www.enterprisesurveys.org. Note that the data are no longer collected every 
three years, the gap is now larger. 
15 
 
where industrial operations take place or services are provided. A firm may be composed of 
one or more establishments. For the purposes of this survey an establishment makes its own 
financial decisions and have its own financial statements separate from those of the firm. An 
establishment also has its own management and control over its payroll. Small firms are 
establishments with the number of employees of 1 to 19 persons. Medium firms are 
establishments with the number of employees of 20 to 99 persons. Large firms are 
establishments with the number of employees of 100+ persons (World Bank, 2009; 2013). 
Altogether small and medium firms represent around 90% of the two samples (2009 and 2013), 
where small firms (1 to 19 persons) represent 45-50% of the two samples. These figures are in 
line with the share of small firms in the Kazakhstani economy.  The number of observations in 
2009 were 544; 2012/13 were 600.  The Enterprise Surveys (Kazakhstan) were conducted 
across all geographic regions (oblasts) and cover small, medium, and large firms. The surveys 
are administered to a representative sample of firms in the non-agricultural formal private 
economy and includes the manufacturing, services sector, transportation and construction 
sectors. However, public utilities, government services, health care, and financial services 
sectors were not included in the sample. Enterprise Surveys collect a wide array of qualitative 
and quantitative information through face to face interviews with firm managers and owners 
regarding the business environment in Kazakhstan and the productivity of their firms. The 
topics covered in Enterprise Surveys include infrastructure, trade, finance, regulations, taxes 
and business licensing, corruption, crime and informality, finance, innovation, labor, and 
perceptions about obstacles to doing business. (World Bank 2009, 2013). 
As a preliminary data screening procedure we performed a multicollinearity test. This 
examined the variance inflation factors for all variables, finding each less than 10. Thus we 
have low severity of a multicollinearity problem. In addition, the Pearson correlation 
coefficients were examined, with all of them being statistically significant in a full sample at 
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5% significance level and p <0.70 to address multicollinearity concerns. We analysed all 
variables histograms and found that the errors are independent and identically distributed with 
constant variance. In the presence of multicollinearity the variance is greater and this affects 
standard errors. 
 
4.3. Variables  
Dependent variables  
We develop two distinctive models with two dependent variables: (i), employment growth 
over 3 years (change in the number of employees over the three year period before the report 
year); (ii) sales growth over 3 years (change in total sales over the three year period before the 
report year).  
Above named dependent variables are used in the literature which relates corruption with 
firm performance (Mohammadi Khyareh 2017; Wiseman 2015; Rodriguez et al. 2005; Shleifer 
& Vishny 1993), in particular in developing and transition economies (Estrin et al. 2013; Festus 
















 Fig. 1 provides the distribution of sales growth, employment growth and corruption 
across Kazakhstani companies. 
  
 
Fig. 1. The distribution of the two dependent variables across Kazakhstani firms 
Number of obs.: 933 
Source: World Bank Enterprise data available at: http://ebrd-beeps.com 
 
Data sources and a description of variables are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1  
Descriptive statistics of variables included in the study  
 





Employment growth over 3 last years, % 18.82 51.86 -85.00 366.67 
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sales growth Sales growth over 3 last years, % 76.04 159.8 -99.83 650.00 
Age Age of firm, years  10.69 7.64 1.00 86.00 
foreign Share of firm owned by a foreign company (investor)  3.53 17.05 0.00 100.00 
state Share of firm owned by public company (government) 0.37 4.74 0.00 90.00 
certificate Firm has an internationally recognized quality certification=1, 0 
otherwise 
0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00 
manager  Top manager years of experience 13.48 9.69 1.00 50.00 
female CEO  Top manager female=1, 0 otherwise 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
email  Email is used to communicate value=1, 0 otherwise 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Web  Website is used to communicate value=1, 0 otherwise 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
government 
contract (H2) 
Government contract secured in the last 12 months=1, 0 otherwise 0.67 0.42 0.00 1.00 
corruption 
index (H1) 
Administrative burden adjustment index standardised measure 
calculated using Cronbach alpha , –2.5  smallest to 2.5 greatest 
adjustment (authors’ calculation) 
-0.13 0.54 -1.36 1.94 
corruption How much of the obstacle was corruption: zero – not an obstacle; 
4 – severe obstacle 
1.56 1.45 0 4 
Note: number of obs. 933.  
Source: fourth and fifth round of the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) available at: http://ebrd-beeps.com 
 
Explanatory variables 
Our first explanatory variable is firm corruption. Corruption can affect firm performance both 
positively and negatively. We use two independent proxies: corruption index and corruption as 
an obstacle, both taken from the World Bank Surveys (2009, 2013).  corruption index includes 
the cost to firms in terms of the number of meetings requested by tax officials, time spent on 
dealing with government regulations, gifts/informal payments to officials, perceived barriers 
to doing business as corruption, and informal payments (Kaufmann and Wei 2000). For the 
robustness check we use the second indicator of corruption – corruption as an obstacle of doing 
business (from 0 to 4). The difference between these two variables is the regulatory burden 
faced by a firm.  
The World Bank (2009, 2013) report rich statistics on the varieties of practices of 
informal sector, namely, 26.7% of surveyed firms reported bribery incidence (percent of firms 
experiencing at least one bribe payment request); 22% of surveyed firms reported bribery depth 
(% of public transactions where a gift or informal payment was requested), 22.3% of firms 
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expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials; 19.1% are expected to give gifts to secure 
government contract.  
The firms may have provided the “socially acceptable response”. To construct the 
corruption index we used Cronbach alpha approach with the index being equal to (0.75) 
(Cronbach 1951; Wooldridge 2010) using data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey.  
Our survey demonstrates that overall, firms that engage in bribes spent, on average, 
6.9% of sales on bribes (up to a maximum of 50%). Firms that pay bribes in order to secure 
contracts spent on average 11.6% of the contract value (up to a maximum of 30%)2. Only 63% 
of firms said that they did not pay bribes in order to secure contracts. Interestingly, only 203 
firms out of 933 responded to that question. Tax officials requested gifts from one out of six 
firms. On average senior managers spent 7.5% of their time dealing with regulations and 41% 
of firms had been inspected in the previous 12 months. Firms consider tax rates and corruption 
as the greatest obstacles for business. 
Our second explanatory variable is LCPs proxy by government contract, a binary 
variable, which equals one if a firm secured a government contract during the last 12 months, 
zero otherwise.  Securing a government contract is a firm-level indicator which is ad hoc for a 
firm. An increase in LCRs such as number of employees, local products, resources, inputs, 
local capital, land etc. increases the likelihood of securing a contract. We argue that securing a 
government contract is a form of explicit LCP, i.e., the LCP affected Kazakhstani firms’ 
procurement of government contracts. LCP does help Kazakhstani companies win contracts if 
there is no international competition.  The government, ceteris paribus, is likely to give a 
contract to a firm which has a higher composition of LC inputs in their value creation (see Fig. 
2 in Flaig and Stone 2017). Various types of contracts and competitions based on LCRs 
                                                          
2 The bribe to secure government expenditure is often calculated as a share of contract value (Soreide 2002). 
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continue to pave a way to boost domestic industry without incurring significant fiscal outlay. 
By mandating local sourcing of goods and services through the government contracts, this 
indicator at a firm level is able to capture the extent of the firm’s engagement in compliance 
with LCRs.  
Control variables  
We control for firm-level variables (firm characteristics and managerial characteristics) 
as well as year, industry and regional fixed effects.  
Firm-level characteristics include: firm size and age, whether the firm has 
internationally recognized quality certificate, the chief executive officer’s characteristics 
(experience and gender), whether the firm uses IT (web or email) for communications with 
suppliers or customers, corruption index, share of foreign ownership and share of public 
ownership. We identify the industry where a firm operates and the region where it is located. 
In this data set Kazakhstan is divided into 5 geographical regions.  
 Firm-level data includes firms from 14 industries (Table 2) with most of them in retail 
trade and a few in textile. Firms are from all five geographical regions in Kazakhstan with the 
majority of firms from the south (32%) and north (24%). The sample includes small (<20 full-
time employees (FTEs)), medium (20–99 FTEs) and large firms (>99 FTEs). However, most 
firms are small (40%) or medium (40%). The average of firm corruption is within 20 percent 
deviation from the average corruption index across all sectors in Kazakhstan. This is consistent 
with Estrin et al (2013) who described the institutional environment which is likely to be path-
dependent within the same country: hence, we are unlikely to see differences in corruption 
level within the same institutional environment, such as a country.  
Table 2  












Textiles 6 -7.07 29.82 -0.18 
Garments 25 24.67 115.99 0.04 
Food 89 18.12 79.87 -0.10 
Metals and machinery 62 7.12 53.89 -0.03 
Electronics 18 20.75 117.98 -0.05 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 10 9.92 117.75 -0.14 
Wood and furniture 29 5.82 6.41 -0.41 
Non-metallic and plastic materials 60 15.71 61.72 -0.17 
Auto and auto components 2 25.29 22.41 -0.28 
Other manufacturing 81 22.38 94.75 -0.13 
Retail and wholesale trade 313 19.46 76.76 -0.14 
Hotels and restaurants 19 24.67 41.37 -0.18 
Other services 89 10.56 61.55 -0.18 
Other: Construction, Transportation, etc. 130 30.12 86.23 -0.05 






Our main results are reported in Table 3 and Fig. 2. Table 3 includes both basic models 
for fixed effect estimation (columns (1), (3) and (5)) and the model with interaction terms 
(columns (2), (4) and (6)). The signs of the coefficients and confidence intervals between 
both models are similar, although the significance of the coefficients is stronger when 
estimated with all controls and interactions.  
Table 3  
Fixed effects estimation of firm performance using two models  
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Employment growth Sales growth 


















































































































































N obs. 933 933 933 933 
R-squared .118 .148 .171 .205 
RMSE 49.84 49.28 122.34 122.83 
F-statistics 2.94 2.55 4.02 3.05 
Log likelihood -4958.26 -4888.21 -3816.09 -3786.33 
Standard errors robust for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Regional fixed effects, industry fixed 
effects are suppressed to save space. Reference industry=Textiles; Reference Region=Central; Reference year=2009. 
Source: fourth and fifth round of the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) available at: http://ebrd-beeps.com 
 
We interpret our findings using the predictive margins (Fig. 2). The left column of Fig. 2 
contains the results for the firms which secured government contracts as form of LCPs, 











Fig. 2. The moderating effect of local content policy in the relationship between corruption and 
firm performance 
Number of obs.: 933.  
Source: fourth and fifth round of the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) available at: 
http://ebrd-beeps.com 
 
The post-estimation predictive margins (Fig.2) were calculated based on Models 1-2 for 
columns: 2 and 4 (Table 3). We used the margins command in a statistical software STATA 
15 to compute the standard errors of the means. The marginsplot command was used afterward 
as it gives a good view of the shape of the relationship and its economic significance (Williams 
2012). It illustrates the changes in the marginal effect between independent variables 
(corruption and LCPs) and each of the two dependent variables (employment growth and sales 
growth).  For example, from Fig. 2(A) (left column) the predictive margins allow us to measure 
the employment growth as the level of firm corruption changes for firms which secured a 
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government contract. So the increase in corruption from 0 to 2 (twice effect) increases the 
employment growth from 20 to 30 per cent for firms which secure the contracts.   
Our H1 is partially supported. The increase in firm corruption positively relates to the 
increase in employment growth with the values between (7.21-27.77, p<0.05) (Table 3 columns 
(1)-(2)). This shows that one unit increase in corruption index is associated with higher firm 
employment growth (28%).  Table 3 specification 1 demonstrates that increase in corruption is 
positively associated with job creation, approximately 7%, while controlling for government 
contracts the coefficient of corruption increases and remain positive and significant. 
Government contracts are negatively associated with job growth which means that they are not 
labour intense. The distribution of corruption index across Kazakhstani firms lies in the interval 
[-2; 2]. The economic importance of this finding suggests that a move from a lower (first) 
quartile to a middle (second) quartile increases a firm’s employment growth at a maximum of 
27.7 per cent.  
We found no association between firm corruption and sales growth (Table 3 columns 
(3)-(4)). Firms that are more corrupt have higher employment growth, but per se corruption is 
inefficient in driving market sales and productivity (Aidis et al. 2012). As pointed out by 
Francis and Schweiger (2017) “…the presence of selectively applied measures or positions that 
alter the cost of exporting for some (or similarly the breakout cost of entry)” [and] “Selective 
access to cost-reducing mechanisms – including subsidies, credit lines, privileged access to 
licencing and resources, or export promotion” (Francis and Schweiger 2017:190) is likely to 
decrease firm’s premia. We have also found this to be the case with Kazakhstani firms. 
 Our H2 is fully supported. Securing government contracts becomes an efficient 
conduit of corruption for sales growth, unlike employment growth. LCPs positively moderate 
the effect of corruption on firms’ performance by “greasing the wheels” of business in 
emerging economies (Chowdhury et al. 2015; Kalyuzhnova et al. 2016).  
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 The results demonstrate that the level of influence of corruption on firms’ performance 
is conditional on engagement with the government on various policies (e.g. LCPs).  
Table 4 estimates (1) with the proxy for firm corruption as ‘corruption as obstacle’ instead 
of corruption index. Other variables remain unchanged. 
  
Table 4 Fixed effects estimation of firm performance using two models 
 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 
Employment growth Sales growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 































industry & region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 











N obs. 933 933 933 933 
R-squared .126 .166 .198 .232 
RMSE 29.84 34.28 123.34 121.83 
F-statistics 4.94 8.55 5.22 6.19 
Log likelihood -4100.22 -3562.21 -2789.09 -2763.33 
Standard errors robust for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Regional fixed effects, industry fixed 
effects are suppressed to save space. Reference industry=Textiles; Reference Region=Central; Reference year=2009. 
Source: fourth and fifth round of the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) available at: http://ebrd-beeps.com 
 
Having run the robustness check we found additional evidence for the relationship between 
firm corruption and performance (H1). The increase in firm corruption positively relates to the 
increase in employment growth (2.42-4.7, p<0.05) (Table 4 columns (1)-(2)). This shows that 
one unit change in the perception of corruption as being an obstacle for doing business (e.g. 
moving from no obstacle zero to minor obstacle one) is associated with an increase in 





corruption is positively associated with job creation, while controlling for government 
contracts shows that the coefficient of corruption remains positive and significant. The 
economic importance of this finding suggests that perception of corruption as a greater obstacle 
is likely to be associated with higher employment growth.  
The increase in firm corruption positively relates to the increase in sales growth (1.24 
to 17.45%, p<0.05) (Table 4 columns (3)-(4)). Firms that perceive corruption as an obstacle 
exhibit higher sales growth with the major effect from securing government contracts (1.24+ 
17.33=18.57, p<0.05).   
The interaction coefficients between government contracts and firm corruption in Table 4 
illustrate that explicit LCPs positively moderate the relationships between corruption and job 
growth (2.38, p<0.05) as well as between corruption and sales growth (17.33, p<005), 
supporting H2. In case of securing a government contract, corruption will have a larger effect 
on sales growth than on job growth. 
As part of the robustness check for the sample representativeness we used svy command in 
STATA 15, and found that regression coefficients and predictive margins have not changed 
their signs, significance and confidence intervals. We are using the sampling weight on the 
stratified samples of 544 firms in 2009) and 600 firms in 2013 of the World Bank Survey, 
which is applied to weight the sample back to the population of firms from which the sample 
was drawn. For each representative firm (2009) in the sample of 544 observations, the 
population of firms varies between 86 to 6565 firms. For each representative firm (2013) in the 
sample of 600 observations, the population of firms varies between 87 to 9213 firms. The 
variable we used for weighting was provided by the World Bank Survey called ‘stratified 
weight', which was applied as a probability weight.  The probability weight, called a pweight 
in Stata, is calculated as N/n, where N = the number of elements in the population and n = the 
number of elements in the sample.  For example, in our case, if a population of firms has 47328 
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firms with similar characteristics in 2013 and 544 are sampled at random with replacement, 
then the probability weight would be 47328/544 = 87.    
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 At the present time there is limited knowledge of the impact of explicit LCPs on firm 
performance and their links with corruption. Our study examines the effect of LCPs in 
moderating the relationship between corruption and firm performance, using the firm-level data 
on Kazakhstan. 
In this paper we investigated the dichotomy of the explicit LCPs implementations. This study 
makes the following contributions to economic systems literature. First, we estimate the impact 
of corruption on different types of firm performance, including sales growth and employment 
growth. We found that the relationship between corruption and various types of firm 
performance is idiosyncratic (Rodriguez et al. 2005; Shleifer & Vishny 1993; Estrin et al. 2013; 
Belitski et al. 2016). Second, using the World Bank Enterprise Survey between 2009 and 2013, 
based on firm-level face-to-face interviews, we were able to measure the impact of corruption 
on firm performance in Kazakhstan and the role that explicit LCPs play as a facilitator of this 
relationship.  
 Our findings challenge and expand the results for other developing economies (Heum 
et al. 2003; Nwapi 2015; Ovadia 2014; Francis and Schweiger 2017) and capture the role of 
explicit LCPs plays in firm performance.  
Based on the evidence from Kazakhstan we provide a positive answer to the question 
of whether building a special relationship with authorities facilitates better returns from 
corruption. This study opens a conversation on the effect of corruption on the micro level as 
“greasing the wheels” for firm size and “sanding the wheels” for firm productivity. In addition, 
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we spell out the new policies which are required when building a special relationship with 
government while securing a contract.  
The limitations of this study are: firstly, we only measure the corrupt transactions linked 
with informal interactions between the firm and the authorities and the perception about 
corruption as an obstacle in doing business. This does not always truly reflect the multifaceted 
phenomenon of corruption.  Secondly, our sample of firms is rotated, which does not allow us 
fully to investigate the dynamics of corrupt behaviour and the time response to the introduction 
of explicit LCPs for firm performance. Thirdly, we only capture the ability of the firm to secure 
a contract with the government as a proxy for explicit LCPs.  This does not always represent 
the full spectrum of the explicit LCPs available for government use.  The process of 
investigating risks which are related to implementation of explicit LCPs in emerging 
economies is a very complex problem due to the fact that it is hard to monitor, to audit and to 
detect both firm corruption and firm compliance with explicit LCPs. 
One of the important policy recommendations arising from this study is that the 
governments using the LC instrument should be aware of the potential risks related to corrupt 
activities.  The failure of explicit LCPs is often explained by the fact that the corruption 
opportunities have triggered a lack of transparency in the implementation of such LCPs.  There 
are clear disincentives caused by the conjunction of LCPs and corruption for companies 
planning to invest to such economies.  It sends a bad signal about the quality of the economic 
system in which the given LCPs is implemented.   
In order to increase competitiveness, the Kazakhstani government is in need of 
designing a strategy which would take into consideration the particular pillars supporting local 
firms. Until 2021(the end of WTO transition period) this will include both protectionist 
measures (in the form of explicit LCPs) and competition policy. Further research will consider 
the question of different LCPs roles in facilitating the competitiveness of firms and of 
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Kazakhstani economy in general, before and after 2021.  The experience of some resource-rich 
countries demonstrates that in some cases, LCPs can stimulate domestic product development 
and exports; other cases show that LCPs can become an impediment to the achievement of 
competitiveness (Kalyuzhnova, et.al. 2016). At the present time, in order to improve the 
governance of LCP implementation, Kazakh National Agency on Local Content (NADLoc) 
needs to create an enforcement unit with a high level of authoritative capacity in order to 
monitor, evaluate and enforce compliance. To ensure the benefits of LCPs, transparency has to 
be promoted and be linked to a stable and predictable business environment for foreign and 
domestic firms. This implies that the implementation of the policy needs to be closely 
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